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Abstract Abstract Abstract Abstract Abstract: This essay discusses the historical and textual representations of
piracy in the writings of Hugo Grotius, primarily De Indis/De iure praedae
(1603-1608) and the Commentarius in Theses XI (c. 1600). Contrary to popular
belief, Grotius, in stark contrast to Jean Bodin, was not an advocate of the
constitutionally homogenous Nation-State. Rather, his central concept of
divisible sovereignty, the lynchpin of the constitutional theory of his early
writings, unambiguously presents us with the object of the heterogeneous
State. In Grotian theory, the State may be “read” as a composite construction,
with a residual degree of inalienable sovereignty accruing at each unit-level.
Even if only unconsciously, Grotius describes a concurrent para-political
sub-division of the state between institutional Government (the “magistrates”)
and civil society, one that constitutes an operational system of governance
within the Nation-State. Like his contemporary Johannes Althusius, Grotius’
theory allows for the emergence of a wholly “private,” albeit lawful, mode of
authority. This is most apparent in Grotius’ treatment of the mercantile
trading Company and its Privateering operations. The corporatist theory of
sovereignty permits the Company’s private agents of violence, the legally
ambivalent Privateer/Pirate, to be invested with a requisite degree of
sovereignty. The Grotian theory of divisible sovereignty, investing the
seventeenth-century Pirate band with legal personality, serves as a vital
historical precursor to the quasi-statist (trans-) national criminal cartels of
the twenty-first century. The Grotian Pirate/Privateer/Just Avenger,
therefore, is a “nomad”: a liminal entity that simultaneously transverses both
geographical and juro-political spaces, rendering him or herself
in-determinable.The Journal of Philosophical Economics IV:1 (Special issue 2010) 147
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[A] transformation may take place, not merely in the case of individuals, as when
Jephtes, Arsaces, and Viriathus instead of being leaders of brigands, became lawful
chiefs, but also in the case of groups, so that those who have been robbers embracing
another mode of life became a state.
—Hugo Grotius, De iure belli ac pacis
Introduction: the pirate as “judicial nomad” Introduction: the pirate as “judicial nomad” Introduction: the pirate as “judicial nomad” Introduction: the pirate as “judicial nomad” Introduction: the pirate as “judicial nomad”
In C. XI—the “Historica”[1]—of De Indis,[2] Hugo Grotius mentions a
mysterious Portuguese renegade known only as “Rasalala” (tentatively identified
as the Rajah of Lalang), a “Portuguese by origin, born in Areiro, but an
apostate from the Christian faith and by no means un-renowned as the leader of
the pirates in those regions” (Grotius 1964: 189). Not satisfied with abjuring
Christ, Rasalala had set himself at the head of a private army and seized
political power in Sidajoe.
In compliance with a command received from the … ruler of Tuban and from the
Portuguese … Rasalala, who had grown famous through his robberies, had gone to
almost all of the Malaccas accompanied by soldiers from Tuban and by twenty
Portuguese officers, with the purpose of driving the Dutch traders from the entire
region … Certainly that pirate sailed from those parts with approximately forty proas
directly to Java where (so he had been given to understand) the Dutch vessels had
come into port; for he was bound by an oath to capture or destroy any such vessel
[that he could find]. With this end in view, he was soliciting aid in the name of the
King of Tuban from the Regent of Bantam himself. From Java, Rasalala went on to
Jacarta, with the intention of seizing such opportunities as might be propitious for
the setting of his snares (Grotius 1964: 192).
Rasalala, like other such Pirates, or “pariah entrepreneurs,”[3] bears the sign of
what anthropologists call “liminality,” the traversing of cultural frontiers.
The attribute of liminality, or of liminal personae (‘threshold people’) are necessarily
ambiguous, since this condition and these persons elide or slip through the networkEric Wilson 148
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of classifications that normally locate states and positions in cultural space. Liminal
entities are neither here nor there; they are betwixt and between the positions
assigned and arranged by law, custom, convention and ceremonial (Turner 1969: 95).
The pirate’s archetypal “anti-social” status as “enemy of all mankind”—the pirate
as one who takes up arms against both his natural and political family (the
state)—is a dominant motif within piratical literature and jurisprudence. The
“first cousin” to the Pirate, the Bandit/Brigand, also exhibits similar liminal
qualities.
The crucial fact about the bandit’s social situation is its ambiguity. He is an
outsider and rebel, a poor man who refuses to accept the normal rules of
poverty…This draws him close to the poor; he is one of them. It sets him in
opposition to the hierarchy of power, wealth and influence; he is not one of them…At
the same time the bandit is, inevitably, drawn into the web of wealth and power,
because, unlike other peasants, he acquires wealth and exerts power. He is “one of us”
who is constantly in the process of becoming associated with “them” (Hobsbawm
1969: 87-8).
The liminal pirate/brigand constitutes an exquisitely material embodiment of
the Derridean principle of iterability, “rhetorical reversibility.”[4] In addition to
blurring the orthodox demarcations between religious (i.e., the renagodoes of the
Barbary Coast), racial and gender[5] (i.e., trans-sexuality and homosexuality)
identities, the Pirate was the quintessential “juridical nomad” who frequently
traversed the porous juridical spaces separating unlawful maritime “pariah
entrepreneur” and the ostensibly “lawful” Privateer. In parallel fashion, the
High Seas as juridically “empty” space res nullius signify a liminal cultural
zone, subverting all taxonomic classifications of established juridical
hierarchies. In more prosaic terms, “if you stuck to the territoriality principle,
the high seas was nothing but a huge expanse of lawlessness” (Sundberg 1993:
393).[6]
It is not the least of the ironies of the history of western jurisprudence that one
of the seminal texts of international public law, De Indis (1603-08) by Hugo
Grotius (1583-1645), should be a legal defence of Privateering. Yet, it is one of
the most revealing of ironies as well, pointing to the juridical legitimation of
state-sponsored organized violence as the normative keystone of global
governance. The primary task of De Indis is “to show that private trading
companies were as entitled to make war as were the traditional sovereigns of
Europe” (Tuck 1999: 85). The doctrinal problem confronting Grotius at the timeThe Journal of Philosophical Economics IV:1 (Special issue 2010) 149
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of textual composition was the dramatic alteration of Dutch privateering policy,
the seizure of the Portuguese carrack the Santa Catarina in 1603 (Borschberg
2004)         marking an irrevocable shift away from orthodox—and legitimate—
self-defence to more legally and morally ambivalent forms of armed
aggression;[7] invariably “privateering wars prolonged the functional association
between war and commerce” (Perotin-Dumon 1991: 221).
De Indis is governed by two signature rhetorical stratagems: (i) the attribution
of an international normative/holistic order to international politics, derived
from competing variants of Natural Law (ius naturale), and (ii) the replication
of the heterogenous political logic of the modern world-system, or the capitalist
world-economy—the trans-border economic “composite of strikingly different
trends of the component sectors” (Wallerstein 1996: 89)—as the juridical
foundation of seventeenth-century international public order. Simply put, the
Text “translates” the operational requirements of the world-economy into the
terms of Naturalist jurisprudence.
From an international legal perspective, the problem was that the Portuguese
regarded the Dutch Privateers as Pirates; juridically, they were both brigands in
unlawful rebellion against Spain and “outlaws” within the exclusionary terms of
the Treaty of Tordesillas.         Similarly, the Spanish regarded all foreign vessels
entering the West Indies as “piratical,” in terms of mare clausum (Zahediah
1990: 146, 156, 160). Natives of Malabar who attempted to trade outside the
Portuguese control system, and anyone else in the area who opposed them were
described by the Portuguese as “cossarios” or “Malavares”; the terms were usually
interchangeable. A “cossario” (in modern Portuguese “corsario”) is, strictly, a
corsair (Pearson 1996). “Corsair,” in turn, was a generic term for maritime
predator that frequently proved inseparable from “Privateer” and “Pirate.”[8]
In wider legal terms, the subversive liminality of Piracy was virtually
guaranteed through the inherently ambivalent juridical status of the practice: “a
legalistic approach runs into the fact that there is not, and never has been an
authoritative definition of piracy in international law” (Dubner 1980: 39).
Privateers/pirates, operating as “juridical nomads,” constituted an irreducibly
chaotic element within the early capitalist world-economy of the seventeenth
century. Ironically, the attempt to clearly demarcate between Piracy and
Privateering was historically governed by extra-judicial forces; the abolition of
Privateering and the subsequent universal criminalisation of Piracy were bothEric Wilson 150
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ultimately dependent upon States de-legitimating privatised armed forces.
“Privateering generated organized Piracy. Mercenaries threatened to drag their
home states into other state’s wars. Mercantile companies turned their guns on
each other and even on their home states. The result was probably the closest the
modern system has ever come to experiencing real anarchy” (Thompson 1994: 43).
At the same time, the universal de-legitimation of privatised armies was
economically viable only after the States had found alternative ways of
generating for themselves an adequately profitable rate of “protection rent.”
“Tribute-paying empires yielded diminishing returns as they drew more
manpower into the maintenance and extension of such conquests. The protection
rents stimulated oceanic commerce and industries which found new markets
from wider trade. In … the period of the expansion of Europe, those fields of
enterprise yielded increasing return” (Lane 1979: 36).
As we should expect, irregularities of legal taxonomy parallel vicissitudes of
state praxis.
Technically, pirates were clearly distinguishable from privateers. Privateers possessed
a state’s authority to commit violence. They targeted only the enemies of the
authorizing state … [Yet] at the end of every war, large numbers of privateers turned
pirates only to be granted new privateering commissions on the outbreak of the next
war. So long as states insisted to exploit individual violence, piracy could not even be
defined, much less suppressed (Thompson 1994: 140).
Piracy had to be proscribed so as to maintain the “correct” hierarchical
relationship between unlawful and unlawful forms of maritime violence, such as
Privateering, juridically signified by the letter of marque. .. . . However, the precise
absence of any requisite form of juridical demarcation, coupled with the
inherent similitude between the dyadic forms of predation, rendered a
self-grounding taxonomy impossible, in both substantive and jurisdictional
terms.
The lack of a legal definition of international piracy shows the relativity that has
always characterised the identity of the pirate [in] the terms employed…pirate,
privateer, corsair, freebooter … When all was said and done, the pirate was the
“other”; he was a problem because he was culturally different (Perotin-Dumon 1991:
202, 210).
On closer examination, Piracy appears to be a composite or “fragmentary”
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The word “piracy” is being used in certain treaties only because of its historical
connotations, even though the context of the treaties demonstrates that the types of
‘piracy’ included therein are usually nothing more than separate domestic crimes of
terrorism (which knows no boundary demarcation) joined together under the word
piracy … If this is so, then there really is no uniform offence or crime of piracy.
Rather, the word piracy could constitute one or many different crimes and acts of
terrorism according to the dictates of the State which is affected by the incident(s)
(Dubner 1980: 39).
According to Rubin, the “word ‘piracy’ entered modern English usage in a
vernacular sense to cover almost any interference with property rights, whether
licensed or not, and was applied as a pejorative with political implications, but
no clear legal meaning” (1998: 42). The minimally adequate “classical” definition
of piracy appears to be “acts of depredation committed by a private ship against
another ship on the high seas for private, commercial gain” (Noyes 1991: 105;
also Perotin-Dumon 1991: 198);[9] the only comprehensive definitions of piracy
are provided by municipal authorities exercising territorial jurisdiction (Rubin
1998: 393).
The textual stratagem of Grotius therefore turned on the discursive invalidation
of Portuguese imperialism while simultaneously symbolically validating Dutch
maritime predation as a lawful activity cognisable within oceanic spaces that
supersede national jurisdiction; res extra commercium. As always, the “solution”
to the dilemma lay within the rigorous application of the universal Grotian
panacea of iterable Divisible Sovereignty.
Divisible sovereignty and political pluralism Divisible sovereignty and political pluralism Divisible sovereignty and political pluralism Divisible sovereignty and political pluralism Divisible sovereignty and political pluralism
The United Provinces: divisible sovereignty and heterology
The paradoxical intrastitial position of the Dutch Republic as lawful rebel
against Iberian empire on the one hand and as legitimate hegemon on the other
underlines the discursive correlation between a war of national liberation and
Dutch leadership within the world-economy. The Grotian text had to perform
the somewhat thankless task of providing an internally coherent rhetorical
stratagem that would symbolically validate implicitly contradictory agendas: the
creation of an inter-state system of formally equal States within the emergent
core zone of Western Europe, and the legitimation of the exploitative
domination of the Periphery by these same states.Eric Wilson 152
Wilson, Eric (2010) ‘“The dangerous classes”:
Hugo Grotius and seventeenth-century piracy as a primitive anti-systemic movement’,
The Journal of Philosophical Economics, IV:1, 146-183
A signature characteristic of De Indis is the recurrent juxtaposition of
contending forms of sovereignty; the binary opposition between monistic and
“divisible” sovereignty forms a cardinal antinomy of both De Indis in particular
and of the Grotian corpus as a whole. As Keene (2002) rightly points out, much
of the “statist myopia” of both International Law and International Relations is
the end product of a superficial, if not actually naïve, understanding of the
complex cross-currents of early modern History, which leads directly, in turn, to
a facile belief in an essentializing statist “presence.”
Since [Jean] Bodin, indivisibility has been integral to the concept of sovereignty itself.
In international political theory, this means that whenever sovereignty is used in a
theoretical context to confer unity upon the state as an acting subject, all that it
conveys is that this entity is an individual by virtue of its indivisibility, which is
tautological indeed. What follows from this search for the locus of sovereignty in
international political theory, however necessary to its empirical testability, is thus
nothing more than a logical sideshow; the essential step towards unity is already taken
whenever sovereignty figures in the definition of political order. Whether thought to be
upheld by an individual or a collective, or embodied in the state as a whole, sovereignty
entails self-presence and self-sufficiency; that which is sovereign is immediately given
to itself, conscious of itself, and thus acting for itself. That is, as it figures in
international political theory, sovereignty is not an attribute of something whose
existence is prior to or independent of sovereignty; rather, it is the concept of
sovereignty itself which supplies this indivisibility and unity (Bartelson 1995: 28).
The main discursive differences between Bodin’s On Sovereignty (see Franklin
2001) and Grotius’ De Indis may be attributable to the different roles played by
their respective countries (France and Holland) within the core zone of the
modern world-system. France, as a non-hegemon but a “strong” state within the
core, led Bodin to concentrate on the requirements of robust intra-state
formation, yielding a textually constructed reification of political unity.
Holland, as the nascent hegemon within the still crystallizing capitalist
world-economy lay at the vital nexus between intra- and interstate crosscurrents.
As a result, Grotius was committed to a discursive strategy of formulating the
hegemonic requirements of maritime supremacy and world-market penetration
within an international schema that permitted a plurality of political actors
and stratagems.
It is no exaggeration to say that in the seventeenth century, it was the more
speculatively metaphysical system-builders [Bodin] who believed in the indivisibility of
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of nations [Grotius] were the ones who upheld the empirically verifiable doctrine that
sovereignty was divisible … [Grotian Divisibility Theory] recalls the complex
hierarchies of overlapping jurisdictions that … were symptomatic of medieval
Christendom, and precisely the opposite of the modern world where political authority
is believed to come in neat territorial packages labelled “sovereignty.” … The imperial
constitution, the territorial sovereignty of the states and the reserved right of the
emperor made it hard for lawyers to ignore the fact that, whatever the attractions of
the Bodinian theory in principle, sovereignty was divided in practice (Keene 2002: 105).
As Advocaat-Fiscal of Holland and as political confidant of the Grand Pensionary
Johannes van Oldenbarnevelt         (1547-1619), Grotius’ ruminations of primitive
international legal scholarship were inevitably governed by domestic political and
constitutional considerations; ordinarily, this meant legitimising the
self-proclaimed national independence of the United Provinces (see Wilson 2006a).
The Dutch Revolt was a regionally based internal war with oligarchic republican
libertas protected by a decentralized and cost-efficient military organization.[10]
The Grotian corpus naturally reflects both intra- and interstate concerns with
both anti-sectarianism and republican ideology (Smit 1970: 48). Accordingly, De
Indis exhibits a recurrent set of expressly juro-political concerns, including the
notion of the “minimalist” State, a “minimal moral philosophy,” and with what
Tuck has identified as “un-theism,” the systematic attempt to ground a viable form
of international public order in a post-theological “naturalist” landscape.
Accordingly, an early Grotian text, the Commentarius in Theses XI (c.1600), a
wide-ranging defence of the “Dutch Revolt” as a “Just War,” marks a radical
departure from traditional sixteenth-century “resistance theory,” primarily
Monarchomachism (Van Gelderen 1985: 269-76) and Constitutionalism
(Borschberg in Grotius 1994: 169-92).
Orthodox theories of resistance, or lawful rebellion, were grounded in two
cardinal premises, “natural liberty” and the notion of the “inferior magistrate.”
Under the first, “the People” (publicae) are the true bearers of that legal identity
and personality which historically pre-dates any particular social formation;
consequently, any subsequent act of lawful political incorporation rests upon the
voluntary transfer of inalienable rights from the People to the Polity. Under the
second, the People possess an inalienable right to exercise lawful armed force
against an otherwise legitimate public authority that has violated the conditions
of the foundational act of conveyance through acts of tyranny. Broadly
associated with the politically more moderate Protestant sect the Huguenots, the
concept of the “Inferior Magistrate” was subjected to a more subversive doctrinalEric Wilson 154
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alteration by the more radically egalitarian Calvinists, who expressly inferred
an inalienable right to take up arms on the basis of “Natural Liberty” alone.
Committed to a Venetian-style oligarchy (Tuck 1993: 159), the Commentarius
(Grotius 1994: 229) rejects radical Resistance Theory (Grotius 1994: 206-13),
postulating instead a via media derived from that multi-purpose free-floating
Grotian signifier, divisible sovereignty, here re-formulated as “residual
sovereignty,” one that is inherent within the secular political order, but capable
of indefinite sub-division. Art. 16 provides a generic definition of sovereignty:
“That supreme right to govern the state which recognizes no supreme authority
among humans, such that no person(s) may, through any right [ius] of his own,
rescind what has been enacted thereby” (Grotius 1994: 215).
The text then moves to a more detailed empirical consideration of actus summae
potestatis, those necessary “marks” or signs of sovereignty; intriguingly, “right” is
clearly associated with “power.”
Those that no one may rescind by virtue of any higher right, for example, the
supreme right to introduce legislation and to withdraw it, the right to pass judgement
and to grant pardon, the right to appoint magistrates and to relieve them of their
office, the right to impose taxes on the people (Grotius 1994: 225).
Accordingly:
If some marks [acti] rest with the prince, and others with the senate, or rather with
the prince and the senate, one cannot claim that full sovereignty is either with the
prince or with the senate, but [only] with the prince and the senate [together]. The
prince and the senate, however, are not one but several (Grotius 1994: 229).
The Commentarius then provides a “primitive” theory of constitutional checks
and balances, which is inseparable from a residual sovereignty that is identified
with libertas.
There are many benefits arising from dividing the marks of sovereignty and for this
reason it is held to be prudent to keep some separate. Not least of these is that it
seems to be the most convenient way of preventing tyranny (Grotius 1994: 249).
In other words, there is a conditional right of resistance, dependent in turn upon
issues of historical evidence and political identity. The Commentarius asserts
(Grotius 1994: 219, 281-3) that there is persuasive historical evidence of a
continuing presence of residual sovereignty within the Dutch “People” (i.e., theThe Journal of Philosophical Economics IV:1 (Special issue 2010) 155
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“Batavians”), institutionally expressed through the Ordines.[11] As the Dutch
Estates never expressly conveyed to “the prince” (i.e., Spain) the power to tax,
libertas can be legally classified as a “legitimate spoil” of bellum iustum, a
lawful armed struggle between rival public authorities waged in pursuit of the
enforcement of ius. “Batavian private persons” (i.e., the Dutch), in both their
particular and universal aspects, are co-sovereigns with the Spanish Crown, and
constitute their own form of legitimate—and self-legitimising—public
authority, that greatest of all republican conceits.
The war against Philip was at its inception a just war both in respect of its cause
and with regard to [the Batavian’s] defence of their marks of sovereignty. … We have
demonstrated briefly that it was legitimate for the States of Holland to convene
against Philip; that the war was both just and public that was undertaken by them
either unanimously or on the basis of majority decision; and that all the marks of
sovereignty that once rested with Philip were [subsequently] acquired by the States
[of Holland] (Grotius 1994: 283).
Divisible Sovereignty and bellum iustum receive even more radically republican
expression in De Indis which provides a crucial textual/discursive linkage
between the Just War waged by the Dutch East India Company (the VOC) and
the republican precepts of the lawful war of national liberation.
The power that has been bestowed upon a prince can be revoked, particularly when
the prince exceeds the bounds defining his office, since in such circumstances he
ceases ipso facto to be regarded as a prince (Grotius 1964: 289).
Herein, residual sovereignty and republicanism are neatly fused with the
self-grounding legitimation of Dutch national independence.
Since the State has no superior, it is necessarily the judge even of its own cause.
Thus the assertion made by Tacitus … was true, namely that by a provision
emanating from the Divine Will, the people were to brook no other judge than
themselves (Grotius 1964: 24-5).
It is tempting to discern a (sub-) textual Derridean “pun” that operationally
co-joins the dyadic texts. For Derrida, “puns” are irruptions into the Text that
produce in the reader an awareness, hitherto repressed, of the role played by
signifiers within language and, from this, of the extreme contingency of all
linguistic relationships (Culler 1983: 91-2). The iterability, or radical
reversibility, of the “mark” of sovereignty as itself constitutive of Sovereignty,
unintentionally belies the wholly constructivist—and, therefore, contingent—Eric Wilson 156
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nature of the alleged “Sovereign.” De Indis treats the “mark” in a manner that is
remarkably proto-Structuralist. The actus is inherently ambiguous, not
identical with either potestatis or ius, but an operationally “free-floating
signifier” of the lurking “presence” of Sovereignty (Borschberg in Grotius 1994:
55); “the term actus suggests not a diagnostic criterion which serves to indicate
who possesses sovereign power, but the active exercise of some part of that power;
the rendering function might be equally important” (Burton in Grotius 1994:
205). The radically contextualist nature of the acti highlights the extreme
iterability that governs the Grotian alterity between “public” and “private” actors.
Within this discursive frame, both States and Persons—which include
Corporations (Gierke 1958: 70-8)—are both fully able to respectively exercise the
“sovereignty function” and, thereby, acquire the signature “mark.”
For Tuck, De Indis constitutes a seminal (“essentializing”?) moment in the
Grotian Heritage.
Grotius … made the claim that an individual in nature (that is, before transferring
any rights to a civil society [the Batavians]) was morally identical to a state, and
that there were no powers possessed by a state which an individual could not possess
in nature. The kind of state he had in mind, moreover, was one which was sovereign
in a strong sense … supra republicam nihil est (Tuck 1993: 82).[12]
The private avenger: the privatisation of jus ad bellum
The privatisation of authority yields a “Derridean pun,” a double-entendre
playing upon legal versus criminal “protector.” The juridical blurring of “public”
and “private” protection creates an element of cognitive dissonance. The Late
Scholastic doctrine of “Just War” (bellum iustum) is a juro-theological
expression of feudal dispute resolution,[13] predicated upon public warfare and
lawful retaliation (Grewe 2000: 105-18, 210-18); “the legality of reprisals is
conditioned upon two requirements: the authority of a superior and a just cause”
(Von Elbe: 1939: 671). A crucial consideration introduced by Grotius is that the
authorizing entity merely possesses the minimally requisite mark of sovereignty.
“It was not necessary that the war be conducted by this highest authority itself;
subordinate princes and authorities could be delegated to conduct a bellum
iusticale” (Grewe 2000: 109). In other words, it is the legal identity of the actor
that determines the justness of the conflict. This paradoxical assertion of De
Indis is the logical corollary of an ascending, or apologetic, argument; it is anThe Journal of Philosophical Economics IV:1 (Special issue 2010) 157
Wilson, Eric (2010) ‘“The dangerous classes”:
Hugo Grotius and seventeenth-century piracy as a primitive anti-systemic movement’,
The Journal of Philosophical Economics, IV:1, 146-183
ontologically “thin” Civil Order that gives rise to the “strong” ius of commutative
violence in the form of bellum iustum.
It is not the power to punish essentially a power that pertains to the state [res
publica]? Not at all! On the contrary, just as every right of the magistrate comes to
him from the state, so has the same right come to the state from private individuals,
and similarly, the power of the state is the result of collective agreement. …
Therefore, since no one is able to transfer a thing that he never possessed, it is
evident that the right of chastisement was held by private persons before it was held
by the state. The following argument, to, has great force in this connection; the state
inflicts punishment for wrongs against itself, not only upon its own subjects, but
also upon foreigners; yet it denies no power over the latter from civil law, which is
binding upon citizens only because they have given their consent; and therefore, the
law of nature, or law of the nation, is the source from which the state receives the
power in question (Grotius 1964: 91-2, emphasis added).
Notice how Grotius subtly conflates positive state law with Natural Law; the
“loose” association among rights-holders, which is Civil Society, is then
re-configured as a “Society of Vigilantes,” subject to the transferential
legitimacy of public authority. The net result is a remarkable display of
iterability between contending notions of collective/public and individual/private
sovereignties.
The power of execution [is] conferred upon private individuals by a special law … For
the wars that result when arms are taken up in such circumstances should perhaps be
called public rather than private, since the state undertakes these wars, in a sense, and
gives the command for them to be waged by said individuals. Yet it is true that, in the
majority of cases, the national origins of such conflicts is the same as that of private
wars. To take one example, certain laws grant the power of direct self-defence and
vengeance [Se vindicandi potestas; here, “vengeance=punishment”—EW] to private
individuals, precisely on the ground that it is not easy to resist soldiers and collectors
of public revenue through the medium of the courts [reminiscent of contemporary
Sicily (see Wilson 2009)—EW]; and these particular precepts accordingly represent
what we retain of natural law—the vestiges of that law, so to speak—in regard to
punishment. If the state is involved, what just end can be sought by the private
avenger? The answer to this question is readily found in the teachings of Seneca, the
philosopher who maintains that there are two kinds of commonwealth, the world state
and the municipal state. In other words, the private avenger has in mind the good of
the whole human race, just as when he slays a serpent; and this goal corresponds
exactly to that common good towards which, as we have said, all punishment’s are
directed in nature’s plan (Grotius 1964: 91-2, emphasis added).Eric Wilson 158
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The enigmatic figure of “The Private Avenger” is arguably the most alien—and
the most under-appreciated—juridical construct within the Grotian
Heritage.[14] Van Ittersum (2003) has persuasively shown that the figure was
modelled on no other than Admiral Van Heemskerck, the prize-taker of the
Santa Catarina and first cousin to Hugo Grotius. She situates the historical
genesis of De Indis in Grotius’ efforts to “disentangle” the conflicting rhetoric
employed by the Dutch Admiralty Board in adjudicating the prize. Whereas Van
Heemskerck justified his actions through private reliance upon ius naturale, the
Admiralty legitimised the seizure in terms of lawful revenge, or reprisal; “what
had been revenge pure and simple in the resolution of [the privateers] became
punishment for transgression of the natural law in De Jure Praedae [sic], meted
out by private individuals exercising their natural rights” (Van Ittersum 2003:
526).[15] For the modern world-system, lawful maritime predation constituted a
legitimate enforcement of a naturalist form of private authority.
In terms of international legal discourse, however, lawful Privateering at once
signified the inversion of the hierarchy between private and public authority
marking a sub-textual conflation of Privateering with Piracy. Privateering
renders iterable public/private dichotomies through a state adoption of private
agency, the legitimacy of which may be effectively invalidated through
non-recognition by a rival State. The Privateer is inherently “dangerous”
precisely because of the self-same iterability; the radical contingency of the legal
identity of the Privateer constantly invokes the “lurking presence” of the
unlawful maritime predator, the Pirate. Whatever Grotius’ authorial intent,
whether to doctrinally clarify the verdict of the Admiralty or to legitimise the
privateering actions of the VOC, De Indis provides a primitive model of an
international private regime of global governance. “The Private Avenger”
violates that most foundational of constitutional precepts, the State as sole
monopoliser of organised violence. Grotian iterability and juridical inversion
reach their zenith at precisely this juncture, reducing interstate relations to a
collective aggregate of “private” transactions through the assignment of
international legitimacy to any entity that is capable of exercising lawful
violence as a “strong” right, or ius.
To appreciate the radically subversive nature of the Grotian “Just Avenger,” it is
necessary to come to terms, in both an historically and philosophically honest
way, with the legal intractability of Privateering, both as a form of maritimeThe Journal of Philosophical Economics IV:1 (Special issue 2010) 159
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predation and as a cultural artefact in its own right; that is, as a pivotal
institutional innovation of the VOC (see Thompson 1994).
Any strategy [of maritime predation], however and whenever it was performed, was
valid, provided it worked and was profitable. What we are talking about is not a
choice between merchant and corsairs, but men [and women] who were sometimes
one, sometimes the other, sometimes both simultaneously (Nadal 2001: 13).
The VOC’s “internalisation of protection costs” was far more than a form of
economic rationality; Privateering served a vital governance function, marking
the sovereign identity of the Company as an international legal personality.
[Like] the trading empire of the Portuguese king, the [trade] companies were
integrated, nonspecialized enterprises, but with one remarkable difference. They were
run as a business, not an empire. By producing their own protection, the companies
not only expropriated the tribute, but also became able to determine quality and costs
of production themselves. This meant that protection costs were brought within the
range of rational calculation instead of being in the unpredictable region of “the acts
of God or of the King” (Steensgaard 1981b: 259-60).
Divisible Sovereignty, when coupled with “the Private Avenger,” proved endlessly
self-fracturing, yielding a “hyper-iterability” that threatened to render
incoherent any minimally acceptable concept of lawful Sovereignty, and, by
extension, legitimate global governance; “the pirate destroys all government and
all order, by breaking all those ties and bonds that unite people in a civil society
under any government” (Defoe, cited in Perotin-Dumon 1991: 215). The
inherently political nature of maritime predation, signified by the alteration of
State practice between Privateer and Pirate, is itself the institutionalised
embodiment of discursive inversion. Whatever localised success Grotius may have
had in “containing” the subversive potential of the Privateer/Pirate on the
micro-level of the United Provinces/VOC, the exact same dilemma was replicated
on the macro-level of the capitalist world-economy.
The trading company and the protection racket
The global governance of the heteronomous High Seas logically mandated a
juridical regime premised upon ius naturale. This is best illustrated by the
indigenous laws relating to Piracy “which authorized common action of all
maritime powers in the vast expanse of oceanic waters for the purpose ofEric Wilson 160
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maintaining maritime safety” (Perotin-Dumon 1991: 44, 64). Fernand Braudel
has commented on the significance of the “great pirate belt” stretching from the
West to the East Indies throughout the seventeenth century, precipitating a
crisis in global governance; “the increase and ubiquity of piracy were related to
the breaking up of the great empires: the Turkish and Spanish, the Empire of
the Great Moghul and the decline of China under the Ming” (1972: 865). The
taxonomic re-classification of the legal demarcations between Piracy and
Privateering would serve as an integral component of the newly established
capitalist world-economy, premised upon a discursive shift away from “closed”
and towards “open” seas: mare liberum.
Within the euro-centric core zone, however, successful “State building” was
invariably equated with the successful monopolization of violence coupled with
a self-sustaining collection of “protection rent,” either in the form of “tribute” or,
in a more bureaucratised form, of “taxation.”         In Charles Tilly’s classic
formulation
If protection rackets represent organized crime at its smoothest, then war making and
state making—quintessential protection rackets with the advantage of legitimacy—
qualify as our largest examples of organized crime. Without branding all generals
and statesmen as murderers and thieves, I want to urge the value of that analogy. At
least for the European experience of the last few centuries, a portrait of war makers
and state makers as coercive and self-seeking entrepreneurs bears a far greater
resemblance to the facts than do its chief alternatives: the idea of a social contract,
the idea of an open market in which operators of armies and states offer services to
willing consumers, the idea of a society whose shared aims and expectations call
forth a certain kind of government (Tilly 1985: 169).
The political and economic realities of the early seventeenth century served as
sufficient grounds for legitimising the status of the VOC as an autonomous
military force (Hart 1993: 187-215 and McNeil 1982: 102-16).
The VOC … was a pure member’s combine and remained remarkably true throughout
the two centuries of its existence to its universal ideals, though these would imply
military actions to reinforce the quest for a monopoly so dear to the post-medieval
and mercantilist mentality. Armed merchantmen were not considered at all unusual
in the European Middle Ages and Renaissance, and in both their charters, the Dutch
and English companies had the right to their own armed forces, which today is the
exclusive prerogative of material power (leaving aside the question whether the Seven
Provinces of the Dutch Republic could be called a “nation” in this period) (Winius
and Vink 1991: 9).The Journal of Philosophical Economics IV:1 (Special issue 2010) 161
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Pivotal to the hegemonic success of the VOC was the systematic internalisation
of “protective costs”; the institutional integration of military and para-military
activity within the lawful scope of Company activities so as to ensure the secure
transit of capital assets, “guaranteed” or “forced” access to new markets, and the
efficient subsidization of costs through the enforced guarantee of advantageous
rates of return on capital outlays. An exact counterpart of contemporary
international private security companies (see Zarate 1998),[16] the armed
mercantile company efficiently subsidized “low-intensity warfare”—defined as
actions that “occupy a grey area on the spectrum of conflict, representing a state
that is neither war nor peace” (Uyeda cited in Zarate 1998: 81 fn. 30)—leading
directly to the institutionalised “over-lapping” of Public and Private functions.
The managers of the Company, confronted with conflicting political and economic
considerations, created a new kind of balance between non-economic means and
economic ends. Against the demands of the participants, the directors carried through
an aggressive policy, a policy of consolidation and a policy of dividends. But they did
not identify the Company with the State and they did not make the aim of the State
their own. In the long run they did not forget that the Company was a privately
owned business and that its owners were meant to make a profit. The result of this
situation was a hybrid, neither a simple partnership for trade nor a state strategy;
profit remained the ultimate aim, but under conditions which tended to make the
presentation and growth of the capital as important as, or more important than, the
payment of demands. At least as early as 1609, but probably already in 1606, the
Heeren XVII realized that the non-economic means might be used for economic ends,
and that the acts of war in the East might be turned into a profitable investment.
Even if it might be a waste of time to combine the functions of soldier and merchant
in one person, the Company found that it was no waste to combine economic and
non-economic activities in one enterprise. The instruments of violence under the
control of the Company were to some extent used for the purposes of organized
plunder; they were in general used to safeguard and further economic activities, but
they did not become an end in themselves (Steensgaard 1981a: 251-2).[17]
The Iberians were clearly aware of the war-making/state-building capacity of
the Corporate Sovereign; the dissolution of both the WIC and the VOC were
Spanish preconditions for the Armistice of 1609 (Israel 1982: 33), marking the
de facto end of the Dutch Revolt (see Wilson 2006b).
It is striking to observe the various ways in which primitive modes of
international juridical discourse overtly anticipate fundamental innovations in
Deconstruction and Critical Legal Studies theory. In many crucial respects,Eric Wilson 162
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Post-Structuralism could be persuasively viewed as a re-formulation of central
tenets of early or “pre”-modern thought. The Derridean “sign” of the categorical
substance of the “self-presence” of Sovereignty is an obvious and weighty example.
Consistent with the logic of sublimation, [the modern juridical discourse of
Sovereignty] places the metaphysical unity of the state in opposition to its outside,
its ethical negation. The international system is marked by the absence of unity
right from the start; it is pure plurality. From this opposition, everything else
follows: what is listed as essential to statehood is absent in the international realm,
and vice versa. The whole range of dichotomies employed in international political
theory to demarcate the domestic from the international gains logical and rhetorical
impact from this single ontological gesture and the systematic play of identity and
difference brings into being. What makes a make State a State and thus identical
with itself is the difference from what is different from identity: difference
(Bartelson 1995: 28-9).
Rather arbitrarily, Grotius obviates the potentially infinite sub-divisibility of
sovereignty: “Arguments that are used against the prince could by the same
reasoning be used against other governors of the state; and this is the path to
sedition” (Grotius 1994: 215). Although republican, De Indis is suffused by a
patrician conservatism; the discursive requirement of providing an “apology” for
a primitive Positivism is one of the main anchors of the text. As Tanaka has
noted:
It is revealing that Grotius himself completely fails to consider the possibility of
right becoming separated from law. In Grotius’ system, municipal law which is
contrary to natural law cannot have any binding force; conversely, in the domains
where municipal law is competent to restrict the freedom that individual persons
possessed before states were formed, it is impossible to approve of resistance or
revolution to attain natural rights (Tanaka 1993: 36).
Throughout the history of this endlessly repetitive inversion, the monopoly of
organized violence has remained the constant primary signifier of the
“non-invertible” dichotomy between lawful and unlawful types of statist
formation. This has now been called into fundamental metaphysical question
through the critical innovations of Deconstruction.
To say that a state is externally sovereign is in the context of international political
theory another way of saying that it is a unity, whose indivisibility hinges on the
presence of a monopoly of legitimate violence, and which ideally speaks with one
voice to its neighbours (Bartelson 1995: 29; see also Giddens 1985: 14).The Journal of Philosophical Economics IV:1 (Special issue 2010) 163
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The problem here, concerning the mark(s) of sovereignty, is that any agency
capable of exerting effective control over organized violence is, by that fact
alone, potentially eligible for legal personality. The subversive potential of this
co-joining of Divisible Sovereignty and organized violence has received classic
treatment by Lane (1979) in his theory of “the protection industry.”
The sea-beggars as just avengers
Within the early modern world-system rhetorical inversion, subverting the
juridical hierarchy between Government and Organized Crime, operates on both
the micro-level of the State and the macro-level of the world-economy. Within
the micro-level of the United Provinces, the Dutch Revolt, premised upon a
popular application of radical Calvinist/Huguenot Resistance Theory threatened
to politically fracture the Dutch patriciate.
The political thought of Dutch Reformed Protestants was revolutionary primarily
because it extended the spectrum of individual rights as developed until the
Reformation. In the minimal formulation of the private person was awarded the
right of freedom of conscience and, if the government ordered against God, of
disobedience (Van Gelderen 1985: 262).
Within the “public” domain, the “danger” of Calvinist Natural Law theory was
two-fold. In theo-political terms radical Resistance Theory (Skinner 1978: 323;
also Van Gelderen 1985) promised an unlimited sub-division of sovereignty. In
socio-political terms, the proletarian origins of the Calvinists threatened a wider
social revolt, politically subversive paramilitary units fomenting popular
secession. The example of the “Sea-Beggars” (Watergeuzen) is illustrative
(Parker 1990). A viciously effective paramilitary marine/amphibious force
recruited from the “dangerous classes” (Wallerstein 1999: 144-8)[18] of the
Calvinist maritime proletariat and “legitimised” by an “official” letter of marque
issued by the House of Orange, the Sea-Beggars practised Lane’s “natural
monopoly” of violence through shifting from Privateering to Piracy as a means
of subsidizing the costs of military resistance.[19]
Within the “private” domain, the Corporate Sovereignty of the VOC was
threatened by an internal bifurcation; as the bearer of the “marks of
sovereignty,” it was impossible for the Company to prevent the unofficial
transferral of actus summi to “deviant” sub-groups (Scammell 1992; Cruz 1986;
Boxer 1969: 296-339) within its corporate structure engaged in acts of “economicEric Wilson 164
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insurgency” (Barendse 2002: 415-16).[20] Viewed as “illicit enterprise,”[21] the
sub-division of Corporate Sovereignty constituted two parallel para-political
networks extending throughout the whole of the Indian Ocean world system: a
“Shadow Empire” (Winius 1983; Barendse 2002: 333-6, 400-10) of informal
patronage systems and an underground economy of “Private Trade”[22] centred
around contraband (Barendes 2002: 460-86, 405-6; Boxer 1965: 23-4, 100-3,
225-30),[23] and fraudulent book-keeping (Barendse 2002: 403-4), both a
striking seventeenth-century confirmation of the “Smith thesis” of the
interconnection of white-collar pariah entrepreneurialism and (semi-) organized
crime. The unregulated permutation of illicit enterprise constituted an objective
threat to the geo-governance of the regional world system, as the episodic
“re-criminalization” of contraband proved both materially and taxonomically
inseparable from the proliferation of Piracy. “Coasting trade and smuggling
existed in a symbiotic relationship; exclusive trade and the one with foreign
entrepots de facto existed at the local level” (Perotin-Dumon 1991: 223). For
Perotin-Dumon:
The chronic fragility of European trade monopolies was never more obvious than
when piracy periodically resurfaced, when a policy of control called previous
tolerance into question. Suddenly the equilibrium between exclusion and permeability
would be shattered because one of the two sides had gone too far: either a state had
imposed an exorbitant control that killed illegal but necessary alternatives;[24] or
contraband had developed into a fully-fledged counter-system that evidently
threatened official trade. … Thus, ironically, the hegemonic nature of some merchant
empires did much to keep piracy alive. As long as monopolies went along with
commercial wars, piracy simply fluctuated according to the degree of a state’s
authority at sea. It was the linkage among trade, war, and hegemonic policies that
engendered a cycle in which smuggling and piracy alternated. Enlisting European
pirates into a guerre de course did keep them under control. To eliminate piracy as a
phenomenon, however, trade monopoly had to be given up altogether (1991: 225, 226).
Ironically, far from resisting these trends, Grotius integrated the phenomenon of
“deviant” Divisible Sovereignty into the discursive formation of the text. By
re-appropriating maritime predation as a form of Just War, De Indis performs a
critical discursive manoeuvre, locating Company activity within the broader
juridical framework of a heterogenous World-Economy. As ontologically
“primary” Natural Society is distinct from derivative Civil Society, public order
suffers from a concomitant absence of a “strong” substantive category of “the
Good”; the sociability of Civil Order “extended only so far as was necessary toThe Journal of Philosophical Economics IV:1 (Special issue 2010) 165
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justify the private right of punishment [jus gladii]” (Tuck 1999: 88). This civil
requirement of private punishment/vengeance/protection is lawfully performed
by that supremely Grotian innovation, “The Private Avenger.”
“Climbing out of hell”: piracy as anti-systemic movement “Climbing out of hell”: piracy as anti-systemic movement “Climbing out of hell”: piracy as anti-systemic movement “Climbing out of hell”: piracy as anti-systemic movement “Climbing out of hell”: piracy as anti-systemic movement
In these terms, the “deep-sea proletariat” (Linebaugh 1991: 123) could plausibly
be seen as constitutive of an early modern “anti-systemic movement.”[25]
Admittedly, Wallerstein restricts the historical emergence of “true” anti-systemic
movements to the nineteenth century (Arrighi et al. 1987: 1), commensurate with
the finalization of the modern world-system; “the central fact of the historical
sociology of the late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century Europe has been
the emergence of powerful social movements which implicitly or explicitly
challenged the achievements of triumphant capitalism” (Arrighi et al. 1987: 77),
structured upon the parallel developments of Organized Labour and National
Liberation (Arrighi 1987: 30-1).[26] Nevertheless, an argument can be made that
just as early International Law constituted a form of “primitive” global
governance, Piracy functioned as a “primitive” anti-systemic movement,[27]
co-determinate in extent and operation with the pre-statist c  c  c  c  capitalist
world-economy.[28] The severe economic dislocations of the European world
system yielded a vast reservoir of vagrant workers—”masterless men” (Braudel
1982: 506-12)—prompting a corresponding obsession with capital crime among
the propertied classes (see Hay 1975), the primary beneficiaries of the nascent
global economy.[29] Because the structural foundation of the world-economy
was network/commercial rather than institutional/statist, the morphology of the
primitive anti-systemic movements exhibited a similar diffuseness. “What
deprived this army of vagrant sub-proletarians of its force, in spite of the fear it
inspired was its lack of cohesion … this was not a class but a rabble” (Braudel
1982: 512);[30] a “rabble” highly prone to brigandage and organized crime
(Braudel 1972: 734-56).[31] To some degree, Piracy successfully imposed a
“primitive” mode of political self-consciousness upon the sporadically insurgent
sub-classes: “Pirates constructed a culture of masterless men” (Rediker 1987:
286).[32] There was an element of objective geo-spatial organization.
Was it possible to escape from this hell? Occasionally yes, but never unaided, never
without accepting some kind of close reliance on other men. One had either to swim
to the shore of social organization, of whatever kind, or build an alternative society
from scratch, a counter-society with its own laws. The organized band of criminals—Eric Wilson 166
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false salt-merchants, forgers, smugglers, brigands, and pirates, or those special
communities, the army and the huge world of domestic service—were almost the only
refuge for those trying to escape from the ranks of the damned. Smuggling and
fraud, in order to exist, had to build a disciplined organization, with long chains of
solidarity. Banditry had its chiefs, its gangs and its leaders—often noblemen. As for
privateering and piracy, they actually depended upon the support of at least one city.
Algiers, Tripoli, Pisa, Valetta and Segna were the bases of the Barbary Corsairs, the
Knights of San Stefano, the Knights of Malta and the Uskoks, enemies of Venice
(Braudel 1982: 512-13).
More important was the correspondence between Piracy and Organized
Labour.[33] The sign of a radically egalitarian form of republicanism (Hill
1986; Bromley 2001; Rediker 1987: 254-87), Piracy formed an anti-authoritarian
“Hydrachy,” the inversion of the Absolutist “maritime state” (Linebaugh and
Rediker 2000: 143-73).[34] There is a remarkable similitude between the micro-
and macro-levels of piratical enterprise. On the micro-level, the Pirate/Privateer
as “pariah entrepreneur” constituted the mimetic parody of the Gentlemen XVII,
the signifier of “a kind of proto-individualist-anarchist attitude” (Wilson 1995:
52). On the macro-level, Piracy signified the subversive (and subverting)
transformation of the deep-sea proletariat into “a floating mob with its own
distinctive sense of popular justice,” that would freely traverse the liminal
boundaries of maritime Crime/Law.[35]
The “underground” history of maritime predation, when synthesized with the
Grotian doctrine of Divisible Sovereignty, yields a fascinating juro-political
hybrid; Hydrachy as the visceral expression of the potential of Grotian
divisibility for juridical inversion, here manifested as trans-national organized
constituting a “primitive” form of the trans-national criminal cartel.
Conclusion: divisible sovereignty and Conclusion: divisible sovereignty and Conclusion: divisible sovereignty and Conclusion: divisible sovereignty and Conclusion: divisible sovereignty and
anti-systematic movements anti-systematic movements anti-systematic movements anti-systematic movements anti-systematic movements
Rome, the mistress of the World, was no more at first than a refuge for thieves and
outlaws; and if the progress of our Pyrates had been equal to their beginning, and
they had all united, and settled in some of these islands, they might, by this time,
have been honoured with the name of a Commonwealth, and no Power in those parts
of the World would have been able to deprive them of it.
—Daniel Defoe, “The Preface,” A General History of the PyratesThe Journal of Philosophical Economics IV:1 (Special issue 2010) 167
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The discursive de-legitimation of Piracy by the State[36] takes place on three
levels: (i) the symbolic validation of the statist monopolization of violence as a
means of neutralizing the revolutionary potential of organized maritime labour;
(ii) the taxonomic re-classification of Privateering as a “lawful” State practice as
the logical corollary of the invalidation of Piracy as a “national enterprise”;[37]
and, (iii) the marginalisation of all international legal personalities, including
non-European States, that did not conform to the taxonomic re-classifications,
through the withholding of formal recognition of legal personality (De
Montmorency 1918; Mossner 1972; Schwarzenberger 1950). Within the core zone,
successful “State building” was invariably equated with the successful
monopolization of violence coupled with a self-sustaining collection of
“protection rent,” either in the form of “tribute” or, in a more bureaucratised
form, of “taxation” (see Hess 1998: 196 fn. 17).
Not for the first time, the discursive strategy of De Indis, replicating the
material contours of the Capitalist World-Economy, leads to fundamental
internal contradiction; Privateers/Pirates, operating as “juridical nomads,”
constituted an irreducibly chaotic element within the World-System. Divisible
Sovereignty pluralizes the allocation of authority, effectively reducing it to an
anti-essentialist act of mutual recognition of certain culturally-defined “marks”
(Friedman 1990: 68-71; Lukes 1990), expressly correlated with the effective
“production of protection.” The discursive space opened up by De Indis ironically
provides the basis for a more sophisticated understanding of otherwise
unintelligible features of contemporary International Law and International
Relations, both governed by the heterogeneous logic of the Modern
World-System. The “public” text of the Commentarius clearly recognizes the
iterable nature of authority, identified with Sovereignty; “Since he who holds a
mark of Sovereignty has no overlord in respect of that mark, it follows that the
right to pass judgement must necessarily be an adjunct of that mark of
sovereignty (Grotius 1994: 277).”         Concomitantly, the “private” text of De Indis
invests the Corporate Sovereign with the public function of commutative justice,
virtually identical with “protection.”
The slaughter of human beings is the greatest of criminal offences, a fact that
accounts for the laws against assassins. Now, the Portuguese slaughtered many
Hollanders in the vilest and most brutal fashion … and therefore, the East India
Company could not conscientiously have neglected to avenge its servants (Grotius
1964: 269).Eric Wilson 168
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The contemporary legitimation of sub-statist authority via performative
recognition creates the possibility of an heterogeneous “post-international
politics,” centred upon a porous “two-world political universe,” one unitary/
state-centric and one heterogenous/multi-centric (Rosenau 1990: 186-91, 6, 11).
Although Organized Labour and National Liberation constituted the “true”
anti-systemic movements, they ultimately failed to achieve a structural
transformation of the modern world-system (Wallerstein 2001: 7-22). Ironically,
it is the “primitive” anti-systemic movements of Piracy and trans-national
criminal cartels that may prove ultimately more efficacious, as they signify
more transparently the “Presence” of a multi-centric order;[38] it is therefore
possible to interpret the corruption of governmental structure as the
heteronomous “privatisation” of public authority.
Once the proto-deconstructive implications of Grotian discourse are clearly
understood, one is led to the realization that Grotius, despite his own patrician
biases, lends authorial legitimacy to an inherently heteronomous international
order that potentially de-stabilises global governance. The discursive
constructions of Corporate Sovereignty and the Private Avenger legitimise both
the radical privatisation of public authority and the politicisation of Piracy.
This becomes even clearer when we recognize that the trans-national criminal
cartel is the historical nexus that links Piracy (Abhyhankar 1998) with
anti-systemic movements (Schmid 1996): narco-trafficking (Naylor 1993: 35-9,
41; Williams 2002: 41),[39] weapons-trafficking (Naylor 1993, 1995), and
money-laundering (Strange 1996; Duffield 2001) all serve as vital sources of
revenue for National Liberation Fronts.[40]
We may never be able to ascertain with certainty to what degree the fabled
Pirate utopia of “Libertalia” was an historical community or a projection of the
literary imagination of Daniel Defoe or his shadowy mouthpiece “Captain
Charles Johnson.”[41] Of greater significance is the multiform way in which the
liminality of the Pirate intersected with the overlapping crosscurrents of both
the early World-Economy and the rhetorical migrations of international legal
discourse. As was ordinarily the case with Grotius, the more immediate solution
to the problem of “piratical sovereignty” lay within the taxonomic
reclassification via Natural Law; here, “the rogue Seaman” (i.e., the Pirate) as,
respectively, “bandit,” “brigand,” or, most potently, as politicised “rebel.” The
re-classification of both sets of maritime predator through the application of ius
naturale served as a means of discursively establishing a self-legitimatingThe Journal of Philosophical Economics IV:1 (Special issue 2010) 169
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parameter governing the juro-political “space” of the lawful exercise of organized
maritime violence. The sign-system of non-infinitely divisible sovereignty lay
within the taxonomic re-categorization of the pirate/bandit/brigand/rebel as
Pirate omnium mortalia hostes communes. But, once again, the presence of
competing ontologies yields a surfeit of textual fissuring and a pluralizing
fragmentation of juro-political identities.
Endnotes Endnotes Endnotes Endnotes Endnotes
[1] De Indis consists of three separate segments, or “grafts”: (i) the Historica/
C.XI, which treats the history of the Luso-Dutch inter-state rivalry in the East
Indies; (ii) the Dogmatica/C. I, III-X, and XII-XV, which legitimizes maritime
prize-taking in terms of Just War, and (iii) the Prolegomena/C. II, which
functions as a separate “gloss” on the Dogmatica. For discussion, see Wilson
(2006a).
[2] Commonly known as “The Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty,” but
referred to here as De Indis; see Tuck (1993: 170).
[3] Castells (1998: 166-205): “a private agent who manages to achieve monopoly
over violence in a specific territory [who] eventually becomes a public actor.” See
Catanzaro (1994: 270).
[4] For iterability’s relationship with both “alteration” and “replication,” see
Gasché (1986: 212-17).
[5] “Attributes of sexlessness and anonymity are highly characteristic of
liminality. In many kinds of initiation where the neophytes are both sexes,
males and females are dressed alike and referred to by the same name” (Turner
1969: 102-3).
[6] See Wilson (1995: 39-69), Kinkor (2001), Appleby (2001), Rediker (2001),
Burg (1983), Murray (2001a, 2001b).
[7] In economic terms, the policy shift towards aggressive maritime predation
may have constituted an effort to secure a new source of “protection rent” even if
only negatively through the displacement of higher protection costs to the
Portuguese. “There are some protection costs which are obviously defensive—
such as the cost of convoys to ward off pirates; others—such as the cost ofEric Wilson 170
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capturing ships of other nations engaged in competing enterprises-might be
called offensive protection costs” (Lane 1979: 27).
[8] There is considerable evidence that the East Indian principalities frequently
engaged in maritime actions that corresponded to contemporary European
notions of Piracy. Rubin has pointed out that Malaysian rulers often employed
maritime violence when enforcing local trade monopolies (1975: 122).
[9] For a comprehensive review of contemporary jurisprudence, see Sundberg
(1993), who takes a refreshingly nominalist approach to the entire issue: “Many
contemporary problems arise from the belief that words generally, and legal
terms particularly, must have an inner meaning, just like children must have
parents. Legal terms have no meaning except in relation to their practical
context. The understanding of a legal term means only that one realizes how to
use it in communication with others” (1993: 337). Going beyond Sundberg, I
would highlight the relevance of his comments to deconstruction; that the
“practical context” of legal praxis, no less that the “textual context” of literary
criticism, is always unstable.
[10] “The outcome of the revolution—i.e., the confederative constitution of the
Dutch Republic—seems to suggest that the provinces were simply incapable of
overcoming their traditional regionalism and that provincial autonomy was the
most important element in the political creed of the rebels” (Smit 1970: 52); see
Downing (1992: 212-38).
[11] For Grotius, every society, “including States, is regarded as deriving its
existence, in the last resort, from the Individual; and [no society] rises above the
level of a system of relations established by agreement between the owners of
individual rights” (Gierke 1958: 78).
[12] For Grotius, a remarkably “positivist” sentiment.
[13] “Medieval legal thought was still rooted firmly in the archaic concepts [sic]
of revenge. Each legal injury required revenge” (Grewe 2000: 70).
[14] John Locke himself, with classic understatement, proclaimed it “a very
strange doctrine” (1988: 272).
[15] Compare the position of the Dutch Admiralty Board with the speech
attributed to the Pirate Captain Bellamy by Defoe: “I am a free Prince, and IThe Journal of Philosophical Economics IV:1 (Special issue 2010) 171
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have as much Authority to make war on the whole world, as he who has a
hundred sails of ships at sea, and an army of 100,000 men in the field; and this
my conscience [i.e., Natural Reason] tells me” (Defoe 1999: 587).
[16] Although widely regarded as a “shocking anachronism,” the revitalization of
corporate mercenaries operates in tandem with the exploitation of the peripheral
zone by the core zone states; “in most states where mercenaries were involved,
there seemed to be vital economic interests at stake, usually mining and oil
interests” (Zarate 1998: 87, 89). “Analytically, this is the road back to feudalism”
(Wallerstein 1999: 132). In this way, the localized “new world disorder”
engendered by the modern world-system “has given birth to [security companies],
which act as surrogates for state power” (Zarate 1998: 81).
[17] This overlapping of functions was not contingent but a necessity. “Northern
European merchant empires initially arose in close association with both war
and commerce; when the two elements were combined in a predatory and
aggressive trade, it was piracy. And commerce was equally nourished when the
cargo sold in home ports had been seized rather than bought. Violence then was
not a trait of piracy but more broadly of the commerce of that age. Commercial
profits were linked pragmatically to considerations of war and aggression,
though at the same time the state could be expected to put protective formations
in place, like convoys that became a regular practice in the seventeenth century”
(Perotin-Dumon 1991: 201-2). Precisely to the degree that the “private” Company
could fulfill the necessary service of “protection provider” was it legitimately
invested with Original Personality.
[18] Here self-consciously deployed as an historical neo-logism; the “dangerous
classes” was a “concept that came into existence precisely in the early nineteenth
century to describe persons or classes who had neither power, nor authority, nor
social prestige, but were making political claims nonetheless” (Wallerstein 1999:
145).
[19] Herein we witness the “dangerous” migration from political to military to
criminal organization, an outstanding sixteenth-century example of the
convergence between wars of national liberation and trans-national “black
markets.” “In the summer of 1569 [William of] Orange hired some new warships
in England in order to form a new war-fleet, but again after a short time the
captains he appointed turned to piracy. Since Orange was unable to pay [the
Sea-Beggars] an adequate wage, they had no alternative other than to supportEric Wilson 172
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themselves by plundering merchant shipping. It was here that the consistories
came in. The Dutch colonies of refugees in England provided an ideal market for
the prizes taken by the Beggars, and they very soon became the centers of a
highly profitable and efficient distribution network.” Appropriately enough, it
was these very “Pirates” who guaranteed the first phase of the Dutch Revolt by
seizing the port-city of Brill in 1572 (Parker 1990: 121, 131-5).
[20] “The VOC’s success was to no small extent achieved because of the secrecy of
its affairs and its decentralization at home—either of which could with
hindsight appear as weaknesses” (Barendse 2002: 416).
[21] Defined as “the extension of legitimate market activities into areas
normally proscribed for the pursuit of profit and in response to latent illicit
demand. In this context, the loan shark is an entrepreneur in the banking
industry; the drug or cigarette smuggler is a wholesaler and the fence a retailer;
and the bribe-taker is a power broker” (Smith 1978: 164; see also Haller 1990).
[22] The same held true for the English East India Company (see Marshall
1997).
[23] Smuggling “became a way of life that linked the merchants of the core
countries to the producers of peripheral countries they did not directly control”
(Wallerstein 1980: 160).
[24] “For the pattern of commerce to be profitable the goods must continue to
flow; the taxation or belligerent interdiction (or robbery) must not be so
burdensome as to drive trade away; even risk-sharing through insurance must be
managed in such a way that the risk does not become so great as to be insurable”
(Rubin 1975: 22).
[25] For discussion, see e.g., Wallerstein (2001: 25-31; 1999: 40, 70-1, 131-2,
150-3, 204; 1991: 104-22); Arrighi et al. (1987: 1-51). “Rather than chance
associations of individual criminals, eighteenth-century European pirates can
now be seen as a socially deviant subculture engaged in the inchoate maritime
revolt: ‘a blind popular uprising, a jacquerie directed against sea captains and
merchants, almost a slave revolt’. This spasmodic uprising was characterized
more by the centrifugal binding ethos of a primitive, yet definable,
proto-ideology than by centripetal motives of individual greed. It is this gestalt
which nourished the revolt as it waged war on the entire world with astounding
vigour” (Kinkor 2001: 196).The Journal of Philosophical Economics IV:1 (Special issue 2010) 173
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[26] For Organized Labor, see Wallerstein (2001: 117, 166, 168); for National
Liberation, see Wallerstein (1999: 2-30). Anti-colonialism provided the nexus
between the two movements.
[27] To a degree, this assertion is axiomatic; “opposition to oppression is
co-determinous with the existence of hierarchical social systems” (Arrighi et al.
1987: 29).
[28] Some of these arguments can be followed in Braudel (1972, II: 865-91);
Wallerstein (1974: 55-6, 141-3, 196, 198, 200, 211, 218, 266, 276, 280, 334, 355;
1980: 48, 51, 69, 91, 111, 128, 157-61, 163, 182, 188, 198, 238, 249, 260, 271-2);
Rediker (2004: 19-37).
[29] By the beginning of the eighteenth century, “individuals had particularly
good reasons for resisting the nascent European national state. The judicial
system was rapidly turning into a mechanism for defending property and for
producing and disciplining labor. Capital punishment was expanded with a
vengeance. … By 1800, ‘at least in theory, English property law was protected by
the most comprehensive system of capital punishment ever devised.’ … It is not
surprising, then, that resistance to European states and society was fierce nor
that it took the form of an attack on property [lucre causa; animo furandi].
Piracy was not simply or always an economic crime—the theft of private
property. It was also a political act—a protest against the obvious use of state
institutions to defend property and discipline labor” (Thomson 1994: 46).
[30] Braudel rightly highlights the sporadic nature of vagrant insurgency; “its
spontaneous bursts of violence were isolated” (1982: 512).
[31] Again, it is most useful to regard peasant brigandage as a primitive form of
anti-systemic movement, embedded within the internal political logic of the
European sub-system (Wallerstein 1974: 143).
[32] In this regard, Piracy most closely resembles Hobsbawm’s notion of Social
Banditry. A variant of “primitive rebels,” Social Bandits/Pirates are
“revolutionary traditional” (Hobsbawm 1971: 5, 27, 28); see also Hobsbawm
(1969: 24-9).
[33] The international maritime proletariat of the eighteenth century
constituted the world’s “first collective laborer” (Linebaugh and Rediker 2000:
130). “Seamen were one of the largest and most important groups of free wageEric Wilson 174
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laborers in the international market of the eighteenth century … the seamen
occupied a pivotal position in the creation of international markets and a waged
working class, as well as in the worldwide concentration and organization of
capital and labor” (Rediker 1987: 77, and see 205-53; see also Linebaugh 1991:
123-42).
[34] “Hydrachy” denotes “two related developments of the late seventeenth
century: the organization of the maritime state from above, and the
self-organization of sailors from below. As … sailors made the Atlantic a zone
for the accumulation of capital, they began to join with others in faithfulness
and solidarity, producing a maritime radical tradition that also made it a zone
of freedom. The ship thus became both an engine of capitalism in the wake of the
bourgeois revolution in England and a setting of resistance, a place to which and
in which the ideas and practices of revolutionaries defeated and repressed by
Cromwell and then by King Charles escaped, re-formed, circulated and persisted”
(Linebaugh and Rediker 2000: 144-5). The State’s ability to effectively repress
Piracy and to re-establish disciplinary control over the maritime proletariat
was, in itself, a key signifier of that State’s successful transition to Absolutism;
in this sense, the “de-democratization” of maritime violence served as an
indispensable characteristic of juridical Modernity. See Thomson (1994: 43-54).
[35] The political transgressions of the maritime proletariat were most
frequently expressed, in ascending order of seriousness, as desertion, mutiny,
riot, and Piracy. “The mass resistance of [Anglo-American] sailors began in the
1620s, when they mutinied and rioted over pay and conditions; it reached a new
stage when they led the urban mobs of London that inaugurated the
revolutionary crisis of 1640-1” (Rediker 2004: 288-98, 156).
[36] Wholly explicable in terms of world-systems analysis: “the third pillar of
liberal geo-culture was the depoliticised incorporation of the dangerous classes,
which might otherwise be called the taming of the anti-systemic movements”
(Wallerstein 1996: 95).
[37] The “suppression of piracy within national frameworks is important as an
indicator of new State power; in particular the array of policies used to subdue
pirates—including punishment or pardon, regulation or toleration—shows the
concrete limits within which a State was able to assert itself” (Wallerstein 1996:
199; see also Zahedieh 1990).The Journal of Philosophical Economics IV:1 (Special issue 2010) 175
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[38] Rosenau expressly identifies post-international politics with the
un-regulated proliferation of “sub-groupism” (Rosenau 1990: 403-12).
[39] “Those involved in political conflict or war … are increasingly impelled to
use drugs as a source of money with which to buy arms” (Arlacchi 1983: 218).
[40] The work of Robert Jackson on “Quasi-States” or “Judicial States” is pivotal
in this regard (1987: 526-8). Quasi-States “are states mainly by international
courtesy,” correlating with the concept of Juridical Statehood, which is “derived
from a right to self-determination—[a form of] negative sovereignty—without
yet possessing much in the way of empirical statehood, disclosed by a capacity
for effective and civil government—positive sovereignty” (1987: 528, 529).
[41] “On Saint Mary’s [Island], the pirates formed what may well be the most
democratic and egalitarian society in human history … [representing] a natural
extension of common mariner practices” (Rogozinski 2000: xii and 182).
Rogozinski is in doubt as to the innately anti-systemic nature of the pirate
“republic” of Libertalia. However, the chapters on Captains Mission and Tew
which comprise the entirety of the General History’s account of Libertalia have
been described by a leading Defoe scholar as the author’s “most remarkable and
neglected work of fiction” (Schonborn in Defoe 1999: xxxvii). See Defoe’s (1999)
General History, 383-439; even if it is wholly fictitious, it still serves as a
subversive parody of the luminal boundary separating the bourgeois capitalist
from the pariah entrepreneur. “The laughter elicited diminishes, for Defoe has
suddenly revealed another world shockingly analogous to the pirate’s, a world of
politicians and statesmen, in which a more sophisticated group of robbers,
thieves and profligates resides” (Schornborn in Defoe 1999: xxxvii). On Defoe’s
sole authorship of The General History, see Moore (1939); for a contrary view,
see Furbank and Owens (1988).
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